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Abstract—Microprocessors enable aggressive hardware virtual-
ization by means of which multiple processes temporally execute
on the system. These security-critical and ordinary processes
interact with each other to assure application progress. However,
temporal sharing of hardware resources exposes the processor to
various microarchitecture state attacks. State-of-the-art secure
processors, such as MI6 adopt Intel’s SGX enclave execution
model. MI6 architects strong isolation by statically isolating
shared memory state, and purging the microarchitecture state
of private core, cache, and TLB resources on every enclave entry
and exit. The purging overhead significantly impacts performance
as the interactivity across the secure and insecure processes
increases. This paper proposes IRONHIDE that implements
strong isolation in the context of multicores to form spatially
isolated secure and insecure clusters of cores. For an interac-
tive application comprising of secure and insecure processes,
IRONHIDE pins the secure process(es) to the secure cluster, where
they execute and interact with the insecure process(es) without
incurring the microarchitecture state purging overheads on every
interaction event. IRONHIDE improves performance by 2.1× over
the MI6 baseline for a set of user and OS interactive applications.
Moreover, IRONHIDE improves performance by 20% over an
SGX-like baseline, while also ensuring strong isolation guarantees
against microarchitecture state attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern microprocessors enable aggressive hardware vir-
tualization that allows multiple processes to co-locate and
temporally execute on the system. These security-critical
and ordinary processes interact over their execution for an
application to progress. However, these processes suffer from
interference channels due to the temporal sharing of processor
hardware resources, such as caches, translation look-aside
buffers, on-chip networks, and even memory controllers. The
execution footprint of processes leaves microarchitecture state
vulnerable in these shared hardware resources by means of
which an attacker process can infer secret data value(s). Thus, it
is imperative to ensure non-interference for guaranteeing robust
security across secure and insecure processes. To enable non-
interference, various software and hardware based solutions
have been proposed in literature. At the software level, process-
level isolation (e.g., Intel’s SMAP and KASLR) is traditionally
adopted across co-executing processes to guarantee memory
isolation. However, it falls short in providing processor security
as the hardware resources still remain shared across temporally
executing processes [1].
Architectural solutions to prevent microarchitecture state
attacks predominantly fall in two categories. The first cate-
gory comprises of traditional non-enclave based mitigation
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Fig. 1. Performance of various secure processor architectures is compared in
(a). IRONHIDE secure multicore architecture is shown in (b).
schemes [2], [3], where secure and insecure processes tempo-
rally execute on the system. In such solutions, the memory
locations of all processes are randomly mapped to cache loca-
tions, resulting in diminished information leakage via scrambled
address accesses. However, these works only mitigate non-
speculative microarchitecture state attack vectors [1], [4]. To
protect against speculative state leakage [5], [6], prior works [7],
[8] allow only non-speculative data to be committed, and
introduce complex hardware buffers and coherence/consistency
extensions to avoid shared cache pollution with speculative
data. However, moving the speculative data across caches
and side-buffers opens a security vulnerability window that
can be exploited to reveal secret information. On the other
hand, the second category involves enclave-based architectural
mechanisms [9], [10], where secure processes execute in con-
tainers that are isolated at the hardware-level from temporally
executing ordinary (insecure) processes. Enclave-based secure
processors have been commercialized (e.g., Intel’s SGX [9]),
and recent research has also explored robust security against
both speculative and non-speculative microarchitecture state
attacks [11], [12], [13]. Hence, this paper primarily focuses
on enclave-based secure processors, as the software-level and
non-enclave based mechanisms do not provide holistic security
assurances, and are not commercially adopted.
Intel’s SGX creates a pristine environment for the secure
enclave by (1) flushing the core-pipeline, and (2) encrypting
and decrypting enclave-related data, on every secure enclave
entry and exit (context switch). Moreover, it introduces various
hardware security primitives, such as memory integrity support.
Figure 1:(a) shows the normalized geometric mean completion
time of the evaluated applications. These applications comprise
of multiple secure and ordinary (insecure) processes that
frequently interact with each other to assure application
progress [14], [15]. The completion time of various enclave-
based mechanisms is normalized to an insecure baseline that
does not implement the enclave-based security primitives. The
performance of an SGX-like enclave setup suffers by ∼33%
since it incurs overheads associated with pipeline flushing and
cryptography operations on every secure enclave entry and exit.
Moreover, due to temporal execution of the secure enclave
with insecure processes, an attacker process can either directly
monitor accesses made by the enclave [1], [4], [16], or befuddle
the system in making speculative accesses [5], [6], [17] to leak
secure enclave’s data.
Recent academic secure processor, MI6 [11] considers the
Intel’s SGX enclave execution model and provides protection
against all microarchitecture state attack vectors by enabling
strong isolation [18]. The idea of strong isolation across the
secure enclave and ordinary processes ensures that secure
process’s data does not leak through the shared hardware
resources. MI6 ensures strong isolation by (1) statically
distributing last-level caches and main memory region(s) across
secure and insecure processes, and (2) flushing or purging
the state of temporally shared per-core private resources
(e.g., private caches and TLBs) on every secure enclave
entry and exit. Certainly, as the frequency of interactions
across processes increases in an interactive application, the
purging overheads stack up since each interaction invokes the
enclave’s entry/exit protocol. Figure 1:(a) shows that the MI6
architecture experiences ∼2.25× performance loss relative
to the insecure system. It is clear that strong security in
enclave-based architectures comes at the cost of significant
performance degradation. Hence, there is a need to re-think
secure processor designs that provide strong isolation, yet
enable high performance.
All prior secure processor works [9], [11], [12], [13]
consider the processor as a single monolithic entity, where
secure and insecure processes temporally execute. This work
proposes to take a step further in the context of multicore
architectures that incorporate tens or even hundreds of cores
on a chip [19]. Unlike traditional secure processors where
applications temporally execute on all cores, multicores allow
spatial sharing of cores as well. Figure 1:(b) shows the
envisioned IRONHIDE architecture, where two clusters of
cores are formed to enable strong isolation between the secure
and insecure processes. When an interactive application is
executed, its mutually trusting secure process(es) are pinned to
the secure cluster. These secure process(es) interact with the
insecure process(es) using a secure communication protocol,
and do not require enclave context switches. Thus, purging
overheads to mitigate microarchitecture state attacks are not
accumulated in IRONHIDE.
MI6 [11] is considered as the baseline secure processor
architecture, since it is built on top of recent secure processor
works [12], [13]. To model MI6 on a multicore processor,
all strong isolation mechanisms are adopted, where (1) time-
multiplexed private resources are flushed/purged on every
secure enclave entry and exit, and (2) per-core shared cache
slices (and TLBs), and main memory regions are statically
distributed across the secure and insecure processes. To attest
and authenticate secure processes, a secure kernel (similar to
the security monitor in MI6) is implemented. Additionally, a
hardware check for mitigating speculative microarchitecture
state attacks [20] is also adopted from MI6. Lastly, interactions
across the secure enclave and insecure processes are carried out
via a shared inter-process communication (IPC) buffer, which
resides in the shared cache slices (or memory regions) of the
insecure process(es) [11], [15]. However, frequent interactions
across processes lead to intermittent flushing/purging overheads
in the MI6 baseline, leading to degraded performance.
IRONHIDE forms two strongly isolated secure and insecure
clusters of cores, where each cluster is provided with spatially
partitioned private–shared caches and TLBs, and DRAM
regions (on-chip memory controllers are spatially distributed).
The deterministic on-chip network is isolated across clusters
ensuring network packets originated by and destined to a given
cluster do not drift to the other cluster (c.f. Figure 1:(b)–➀).
A key insight here is that the secure process (attested by a
trusted light-weight secure kernel) is pinned to the secure
cluster, where it spatially interacts with insecure processes
via the shared IPC buffer (c.f. Figure 1:(b)–➁). Hence, no
secure process entry/exits are necessary for an application’s
execution, thus avoiding the need for microarchitecture state
flushes without violating strong isolation.
IRONHIDE implements dynamic hardware isolation, where
the clusters of cores are allowed to be reconfigured to ensure
load balanced execution for performance, while guaranteeing
strong isolation (c.f. Figure 1:(b)–➂). The secure kernel
employs a core re-allocation predictor, and orchestrates the
process of re-configuring core-level resources among the two
clusters. To ensure strong isolation for each reconfiguration
event, the system is stalled and the private resources of the
reallocated cores are flushed-and-invalidated, followed by the
re-allocation of memory pages (data structures) mapped to
the shared cache slices (and TLBs) of the respective cores.
Prior works [21], [22] have shown that an adversary can
infer secret-information based on timing and termination
channels introduced due to resource scheduling. However, this
information leakage can be bounded by limiting the number of
unique scheduling events. Thus, IRONHIDE takes a security-
centric approach and bounds the leakage to a small constant
factor by limiting the cluster reconfiguration to once for each
interactive application invocation.
This paper highlights the performance and security pitfalls of
enclave-based secure processors. State-of-the-art MI6 considers
the Intel’s SGX enclave execution model and deals with its secu-
rity limitations by ensuring strong isolation against microarchi-
tecture state attacks. However, strong isolation leads to degraded
performance for MI6 due to frequent microarchitecture state
purging in interactive applications. To mitigate the performance
limitations, IRONHIDE forms spatially isolated secure and inse-
cure clusters of cores, where the secure process(es) are pinned
to execute in the secure cluster. Consequently, IRONHIDE
minimizes microarchitecture state purging overheads compared
to SGX-like and MI6 baselines, while ensuring strong isolation
guarantees for robust security. IRONHIDE is prototyped on
a real Tilera®Tile-Gx72TM multicore, and evaluated using a

leakage channel. To avoid leakage through such a channel,
it is important to keep each process’s data within its own
set of shared cache slices (clustered together). Therefore, a
local homing policy is adopted, where an entire memory
page (or data structure) is mapped to a single shared cache
slice. Data replication in last-level cache is disabled to ensure
that a memory access to each shared cache slice is made
by a single process. This limits an insecure process from
accessing secure process’s shared cache slices. Similar static
partitioning schemes have recently been proposed in Intel’s
Cache Allocation Technology (CAT) [27], and DAWG [12].
MI6 partitions the main memory into multiple physically
isolated DRAM regions, where these regions are statically
distributed across secure and insecure processes. The last-level
cache misses of a process are routed to the memory con-
troller(s) that map the respective DRAM region(s). Multicores
deploy multiple memory controllers, and DRAM regions are
interleaved across all memory controllers to optimize memory
bandwidth. However, shared buffers/queues in the memory
controllers are vulnerable to microarchitecture state attacks.
MI6 ensures strong isolation by assuming constant latency
memory controllers, and leaves the exploration of variable
latency controllers as future work. Since commercial multicores
deploy variable latency memory controllers, the multicore MI6
implements a purge of all memory controller queues/buffers
at each enclave entry and exit. This approach ensures strong
isolation for the off-chip memory accesses.
2) Protecting the Speculative Microarchitecture State:
Speculative state attacks (e.g., Spectre [5], [20]) have shown
that a victim (insecure) process can be tricked by an attacker
(insecure) process to speculatively access secret data by
manipulating hardware structures, such as branch predictor and
return stack buffer. Later, the victim process performs a second
memory request with an address based on the secret data. This
evicts attacker’s primed data from a shared hardware resource.
Hence, the attacker infers (leaks) secret data by observing the
timing difference in accessing primed entries.
To mitigate such speculative microarchitecture state attacks,
a solution proposed by MI6 is adopted, where the physical
address range of the secure process is checked in hardware
for each access made by the insecure process. In multicore
MI6, a hardware check is employed in the core pipeline that
tracks memory accesses destined to data mapped in the secure
cluster’s DRAM region(s). This is done by checking whether
the home location of the data is physically mapped to the given
memory region. If an insecure process initiates a request to
access the DRAM region of a secure process, the progress of
such a request is stalled until it is resolved. Consequently, the
request is discarded if it is resolved to be on the speculative
path, thus incurring no performance overhead. However, if
resolved as non-speculative, the exception handler detects such
a request due to protection check enabled under MI6 strong
isolation. In this situation, the memory request is discarded
without performance impact.
3) Communication Across Interactive Processes: Similar
to MI6 and HotCalls [11], [15], the multicore MI6 adopts
shared memory inter-process communication across secure and
insecure processes. This allows processes to exchange their
respective output states, and the secure enclave to communicate
with the insecure OS. This is achieved using a shared memory
region (referred to as shared IPC buffer) that is granted access
to both processes. Strong isolation for the shared IPC buffer is
assured by allocating it to the dedicated DRAM region(s) of the
insecure process. This disallows insecure processes to access
secure process’s data. However, the secure process (enclave) is
allowed to access the shared IPC buffer, which does not violate
strong isolation because, (1) the shared data is considered
insecure, and (2) no secure data crosses DRAM regions
dedicated to secure processes. Indeed, a microarchitecture state
attack never commences without the insecure process accessing
secure data.
B. The IRONHIDE Architecture
Under the multicore MI6 architecture, the microarchitecture
state of time-shared private resources is purged on every secure
enclave entry and exit that further escalates the state reload
latency when the same process is temporally switched back later.
Alongside purging, static partitioning of the shared cache slices
disallows processes to exploit locality in shared cache resources.
Indeed, these factors contribute to degrade the performance of
co-executing processes, and these overheads stack up as the
interactivity across the secure and insecure processes increases.
IRONHIDE architecture overcomes the performance limita-
tions of multicore MI6 while keeping strong isolation intact.
It creates two strongly isolated clusters of cores, where secure
and insecure processes are temporally executed within their
respective clusters. IRONHIDE adopts spatial partitioning for
shared cache slices and DRAM regions from multicore MI6.
However, instead of time multiplexing per-core resources
(private caches and TLBs) across secure and insecure processes,
it proposes to spatially distribute these per-core resources across
the secure and insecure clusters. Moreover, to enable load
balanced execution of clusters, dynamic hardware isolation
is implemented to securely reconfigure core-level resources,
including the shared cache slices. The on-chip network is
isolated across clusters to ensure that no such packets that are
originated by one cluster and destined to the same cluster, drift
outside the cluster boundary. Only network packets intended
for application interaction purposes are allowed to drift from
one cluster to the other. Lastly, the memory controllers are
statically partitioned across secure and insecure clusters to
enable strong isolation. The secure process(es) are pinned to
the secure cluster where they execute and interact with the
processes executing in the insecure cluster. By pinning secure
processes, these interactions happen without incurring enclave
entry/exit purging overheads.
1) The Spatio-temporal Execution Model: Similar to mul-
ticore MI6, IRONHIDE enables temporal execution of mul-
tiple secure and insecure processes on the multicore system.
However, the temporally executing processes do not require
microarchitecture state flush/purge operations since the secure
processes of an application are strongly isolated from the
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Fig. 3. IRONHIDE with strongly isolated clusters of cores.
insecure processes due to their respective execution in spatially
allocated clusters of cores. If an application comprises of
no secure process(es), IRONHIDE (using dynamic hardware
isolation) reconfigures the system to a single cluster utilizing
all available core-level resources. In such a scenario, the data
for the secure cluster resides in its dedicated off-chip memory
regions that are never accessed by the insecure cluster.
IRONHIDE differentiates execution of secure processes
within and across interactive applications. Multiple secure
processes are considered mutually distrusting when they
belong to different interactive applications. IRONHIDE time
multiplexes the core-level resources of the secure cluster across
these mutually distrusting secure processes from different
applications. When applications context switch, the per-core
shared hardware resources are purged. However, IRONHIDE
considers multiple secure processes mutually trusting if they
belong to the same interactive application. In this scenario, it
co-executes the secure processes in the secure cluster without
purging the microarchitecture state.
2) Strong Isolation using Clusters of Cores: IRONHIDE
forms two clusters of cores that temporally execute their
respective secure and insecure processes. Each cluster is
assigned a set of non-overlapping cores, and their corresponding
cache and TLB resources. The respective process threads are
pinned to their assigned cluster cores.
For each cluster, the network traffic must be routed such that
all requests and data packets remain within the boundary of the
cluster. Thus, a deterministic network routing protocol (such
as X-Y routing) is envisioned in the target multicore, since
it enables isolation of on-chip network traffic. For example,
X-Y routing with 2-D mesh network topology recognizes each
router by its coordinates (X, Y), and transmits packets first in
X direction followed by Y direction. In a square floor plan,
rows of cores are assigned to each cluster with their respective
memory controller(s) on the outside edges, such that X-Y
routing never drifts across the clusters. However, with just X-Y
routing in place, an entire row of cores must be allocated to any
given cluster. If cores within a row are allocated among the two
clusters, it is possible for the X-Y routing to drift packets across
cores allocated to different clusters, violating strong isolation.
Employing Y-X routing mitigates this scenario, since packets
are routed in Y direction first to ensure they safely traverse to
their respective row of cores. Hence, the deterministic routing
algorithm supports bidirectional routing [28] (allows both X-Y
and Y-X routing) of packets in the on-chip network.
For each cluster, the memory controllers must be strongly
isolated such that the respective DRAM region(s) of the
process being executed in that cluster are accessible. Unlike the
multicore MI6 baseline, the memory controllers are statically
partitioned among the two clusters1. The respective DRAM
region(s) are mapped in such a way that they are accessible
from their dedicated memory controller(s). For strong isolation
guarantees, memory controller(s) assigned to clusters must
never overlap each other. Specifically, the secure cluster
dedicates the DRAM region(s) of all secure processes to the
memory controller(s) that allow any given secure process to
access its respective physical memory channels, banks, and
rows. At each secure process context switch, the queues/buffers
of memory controller(s) assigned to the secure cluster are
purged to ensure strong isolation. The insecure cluster has its
dedicated memory controllers and it is free to context switch
without any purging overheads.
3) Dynamic Hardware Isolation: As shown in Figure 3,
the formation of spatially isolated secure and insecure clusters
enables each cluster to temporally execute respective processes,
while utilizing its dedicated hardware resources i.e., private
caches and TLBs, shared cache slices and TLBs, and memory
controllers/channels. However, statically partitioning core-level
hardware resources across secure and insecure clusters leads
to under-utilization of hardware core and cache resources.
To tackle this challenge and adapt the performance varia-
tions among the processes of a given interactive application,
IRONHIDE implements dynamic hardware isolation that en-
ables a mechanism where the secure cluster is allowed to give
up or gain cores [30], yet guarantee strong isolation. Similar
to the security monitor in MI6, IRONHIDE implements a
secure kernel that deploys signature checking and attestation
mechanisms to ensure that only secure processes temporally
execute in the secure cluster. The secure kernel executes
alongside the secure processes in the secure cluster. However,
to ensure load-balanced system performance, the secure kernel
further deploys a core re-allocation predictor that re-configures
the number of core-level resources to the secure and insecure
clusters at the application granularity. Prior works [21], [22]
have shown that an adversary can infer secret-information
based on timing and termination channels introduced due
to resource scheduling, and this leakage can be bounded by
limiting the number of unique scheduling (reconfiguration)
events. Although, processes of an interactive application may
exhibit sensitivity to varying core-level resource allocations
during their execution, IRONHIDE adopts a security-centric
approach and limits the cluster reconfiguration to once per every
interactive application invocation. Thus, when an interactive
application comprising of secure and insecure processes is
scheduled on the system, IRONHIDE computes and sets a
single core-level resource binding (distribution) for each cluster.
4) Heuristic for Cluster Reconfiguration: The heuristic for
re-allocating the number of cores per cluster is deployed
1An alternative is to statically partition memory bandwidth [29]. However,
the on-chip network must still guarantee strong isolation between clusters.


enclave entry and exit (process interaction) [26]. Prior work,
HotCalls [15] quantifies the overhead of each Intel’s SGX
enclave entry (ECALL) and exit (OCALL) to be in the range
of ∼2.5µs to 5µs. This includes the overhead associated with
data encryption and memory integrity verification. To model
the ECALL and OCALL overheads, a constant 5µs latency
is added for each secure process entry/exit. All remaining
hardware resources, i.e., private–shared cache hierarchy, TLBs,
and off-chip memory remain temporally shared across secure
and insecure processes. Thus, the SGX-like setup exposes the
footprint of secure processes to an insecure process.
2) Multicore MI6: The SGX-like setup is extended with
strong isolation capabilities. Each process is provided with
statically partitioned L2 slices, and DRAM regions. For
example, in an application with an insecure and a secure
process, 32 L2 slices and half of the DRAM regions are
allocated to each process. The default hash-for-homing scheme
is overridden with the local homing scheme that maps
each process’s data structures on specific L2 slices using
tmc_alloc_set_home(&alloc, core_id) API call.
Moreover, L2-replication is disabled to allow only one process
to access any given L2 cache slice. All time-shared cores,
their L1 caches and TLBs, as well as the memory controllers
are purged/flushed on each secure process entry and exit. To
flush-and-invalidate the private L1, a dummy buffer of size
equal to the cache size is read into each L1 cache. Reading this
buffer removes all secure process’s data from private L1 caches.
Then, a memory fence operation (tmc_mem_fence() call)
is performed that ensures propagation of dirty data to respective
L2 slices. Similarly, the TLBs are flushed using Tilera specific
user commands. However, all L1s and TLBs are purged in par-
allel. Finally, the queues/buffers of all memory controllers are
purged using tmc_mem_fence_node(controller_id)
call that writes back all modified data to the DRAM.
3) IRONHIDE: The secure and insecure clusters of cores
are formed by pinning process’s threads to respective cores
via tmc_cpus_set_my_cpu(tid). The L2 cache slices
are allocated to their respective cluster using the local
homing scheme. A clusters’ accesses to its physically iso-
lated DRAM regions are realized by forwarding its re-
spective L2 miss traffic to dedicated memory controllers
via tmc_alloc_set_nodes_interleaved (&alloc,
pos), where pos represents the bit-mask representation
of memory controllers to be selected. For instance, pos =
0b0011 is used to dedicate MC0 and MC1 to the secure cluster,
whereas, pos = 0b1100 (MC2 and MC3) for the insecure
cluster. Tile-Gx72TM implements X-Y routing with 2-D mesh
network topology, which isolates the network traffic by routing
each packet to/from the allocated clusters’ memory resources.
The dynamic hardware isolation capability of IRONHIDE
is also supported on the prototype. At each interactive
application invocation, the private L1 and TLB flush-and-
invalidate mechanism from the multicore MI6 baseline is
invoked for the re-allocated cores. To re-allocate data structures
(pages) in L2s, the pages are first un-mapped from their
current L2 home cache slices using tmc_alloc_unmap
(*addr, size) API call, followed by setting the new home
for each page using tmc_alloc_set_home (&alloc,
core_id). Finally, each page is mapped to the new
L2 home using tmc_alloc_remap (&alloc, size,
new_size) call. Note, the prototype only contains private
TLBs, thus only shared L2 cache slices are re-allocated.
B. Benchmark Interactive Applications
1) User-Level Interactive Applications: Three different
classes of user-level interactive applications are evaluated.
• Real-time Graph Processing: This application uses an
insecure graph generation algorithm [31] (GRAPH) that reads
values at various time intervals from distributed sensors, and
generates temporal graph updates for an underlying static graph.
The safety-critical graph algorithm consequently performs
decision analytics on the spatio-temporally updated graph.
Three secure graph algorithms [32] are considered, i.e., Single
Source Shortest Path (SSSP), PageRank (PR), and Triangle
Counting (TC). The insecure GRAPH generation process
generates temporal graph inputs for the California road network
graph [33], and each of the three secure graph algorithms
combine with it to form a user-level interactive application.
• Real-Time Perception and Mission Planning: This appli-
cation builds on an insecure vision pipeline [34] (VISION)
that performs image processing kernels on RAW images. The
VISION pipeline consequently feeds input images to several
secure perception and mission planning secure algorithms.
The mission planning Artificial Bee Colony [35] (ABC)
algorithm is adopted from advanced driver-assistance system
with inputs from a real-world road scenario. The perception
neural network algorithms [36], ALEXNET and SqueezeNet
(SQZ-NET) process inputs that are communicated from the
VISION pipeline.
• Query Encryption: This application uses an insecure query
generation algorithm [37] (QUERY) that periodically generates
database queries for systems (e.g., ATM) to process. These
queries are then communicated to a secure encryption algorithm
from Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to encrypt data
using a 256-bit key.
Each user-level interactive application is executed with 500,
1K, 5K, 10K, and 50K inputs, and the reported completion
time is the average across these runs.
2) OS-Level Interactive Applications: A set of interactive
applications are considered that require frequent support from
an untrusted OS process for generating and processing requests,
such as fread, fcntl, close, and writev [15]. The database
application, MEMCACHED [38] (version 1.4.31) computes
2 million requests via the memtier benchmark [39]. The web
server application, LIGHTTPD [40] (version 1.4.41) fetches
1 million pages (each of 20KB size) through 100 concurrent
client connections via the http load [41] tool.
For all considered applications, the interactions across secure
and insecure processes are carried out via the shared inter-
process communication buffer. In case of user-level interactive
applications, the secure process interacts with the insecure
process for an average of 13.3K inputs executed under MI6
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Fig. 6. Completion times of IRONHIDE against SGX and MI6 baselines for various interactive applications. Geometric mean completion times for user-level,
OS-level, and all appliations are also reported.
for 70 seconds, leading to an interactivity rate of ∼400 secure
process entry/exit events per second. However, the average
interactivity rate for OS interactive applications is measured
∼220K secure process entry/exit events per second. The OS
interactivity is similar to the rate observed in HotCalls [15].
V. EVALUATION
The SGX-like and MI6 baselines, as well as the proposed
IRONHIDE architecture are evaluated for the user-level and
OS-level interactive applications. Each setup is first warmed up
with sample inputs to obtain steady-state, and then completion
time is measured for a fixed number of inputs specified in
Section IV-B. For IRONHIDE, each process of an interactive
application is started with an initial cluster configuration of
32 cores per cluster. The system is then reconfigured to the
load-balanced core-level resource binding after executing the
gradient-based heuristic search. The overheads of re-allocating
cores among the clusters are measured and added to the
completion time. The purge overheads of each enclave entry and
exit for the MI6 architecture and SGX-like model (baselines)
are also added to their respective completion times.
A. Comparison of Intel’s SGX with MI6 and IRONHIDE
Figure 6 shows the completion time comparison of the
SGX-like baseline against MI6, and the proposed IRONHIDE
architecture. The reported numbers show the completion time
(left y-axis) for each interactive application (x-axis). The SGX-
like architecture does not enable strong isolation. Consequently,
it does not partition the shared cache and DRAM regions, and
avoids purging the cache and memory controller resources.
However, it incurs memory integrity checking and core pipeline
flushing overheads on every secure enclave entry/exit. The SGX
completion time results are broken down in process execution
time and the secure enclave entry/exit overheads. These
overheads account for increasing proportion of the completion
time for applications that incur high interactivity. All user-level
interactive applications exhibit negligible overheads, while
both OS-level interactive applications incur significant flushing
overheads.
To enable a secure execution environment, the multicore
MI6 baseline provides strong isolation support. However, this
holistic security comes at the cost of performance, due to (1)
frequent state purging of the private resources and memory
controller queues, and (2) static partitioning of shared cache
and DRAM memory resources. The MI6 setup observes an
average performance degradation of ∼71% compared to SGX.
In addition to purging overheads, the compute component
of MI6 also increases over SGX. This is attributed to the
overheads from statically partitioning the shared cache and
DRAM memory resources, as well as the data locality impact
of re-installing the purged microarchitecture state.
The IRONHIDE architecture also enables strong isolation.
However, it spatially pins the secure and insecure processes
on their respective clusters of cores, and significantly limit the
frequent purging overheads. It experiences a negligible one-
time cluster reconfiguration overhead of ∼15ms. Moreover,
similar to MI6, the spatial isolation of the two clusters also
partitions the shared cache and DRAM memory resources.
IRONHIDE experiences an ∼8.7% performance degradation
compared to SGX for user-interactive applications. This is
attributed to the limitations imposed by partitioning of the
shared cache and DRAM memory resources. For applications
that are not sensitive to the large state partitions, such as
<TC, GRAPH>, IRONHIDE observes minimal performance
degradation compared to SGX. The performance of IRONHIDE
is observed to significantly improve over SGX for both OS-
level interactive applications. As these applications exhibit
high interactivity rates, the core pipeline flushing overheads
stack up significantly under SGX. However, IRONHIDE pays
a one-time purging and re-allocation overhead, resulting in
performance gains. Overall, IRONHIDE delivers geometric
mean performance improvement of ∼20% compared to SGX,
while also ensuring strong isolation guarantees.
B. Comparison of MI6 Baseline with IRONHIDE
The key insight of IRONHIDE is its capability to pin
the secure process(es) to strongly isolated cluster of cores
without incurring purging overheads of repetitive enclave entries
and exits. Moreover, the number of cores per clusters are
adjusted for improved core-level resource utilization, while
the MI6 baseline statically distributes all shared cache and
DRAM resources. MI6 purges per-core private resources and
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Fig. 7. Private L1 and shared L2 cache miss rates for each interactive
application. Geometric mean miss rates are shown for all process interactions.
memory controller queues on each secure process interaction.
This overhead is measured as ∼0.19ms per interaction event,
resulting in the total purging overhead of ∼47% of the average
completion time for MI6. On the contrary, IRONHIDE incurs
a ∼15ms one-time overhead of private cache/TLB purging
and shared cache re-allocation overheads at each interactive
application invocation. The marker on top of each interactive
application bar (right y-axis of Figure 6) shows the number of
cores allocated to the secure cluster under IRONHIDE. The
geometric mean results from Figure 6 indicate that IRONHIDE
improves completion time component of purging by 706×
over the MI6 baseline. However, when accounting for the
total completion times including the execution times of the
interactive processes, IRONHIDE improves the geometric
completion time by 2.1× over MI6.
Figure 6 also shows that the compute time component of
processes improve from IRONHIDE relative to MI6. Purging
the private microarchitecture state under MI6 limits each
process from exploiting private cache locality, essentially
thrashing the L1 cache and TLBs on each purge event. This
overhead is not present in IRONHIDE, since it enables each
secure and insecure process to exploit its private resources
better. Moreover, statically partitioned L2 cache slices impact
the shared cache usage of processes, as a process may demand
larger shared cache capacity for improved performance. The
MI6 baseline operates with a fixed static partition, while
IRONHIDE implements dynamic hardware isolation to improve
the load-balancing of core-level resources, including the L2
cache slices per cluster.
The performance benefits of IRONHIDE over MI6 are more
prominent for highly interactive OS-level applications (∼3.1×)
as compared to the user-level applications (∼32%). The main
reason for performance benefits in OS-level applications arise
from the elimination of purging overheads under IRONHIDE.
However, for user-interactive applications that are sensitive
to cache behaviors, performance advantages also arise from
improved data locality and core-level resource utilization. To
further investigate these performance benefits, the L1 and L2
cache miss rate behaviors are evaluated next.
C. Cache Miss Behavior of MI6 and IRONHIDE
Figure 7:(a) depicts the private L1 cache miss rates for
each interactive application under the MI6 and IRONHIDE
architectures. As compared to MI6, the private L1 cache miss
rates dramatically reduce for IRONHIDE by up to 5.9×. MI6
experiences L1 cache thrashing as a consequence of frequent
L1 cache purging. However, the spatial execution of processes
under IRONHIDE pins respective threads on each cluster’s
cores, and dramatically improve private cache utilization. The
<TC, GRAPH> application does not exhibit much L1 cache
locality for the TC process, while the GRAPH process has a
small private working set. Therefore, the MI6 purge operation
does not impact the L1 cache miss behavior significantly. On
the other hand, TC is executed in a secure cluster configured
with only two cores, while GRAPH executes with the remaining
62 cores allocated to the insecure cluster (c.f. Figure 6). The
TC process incurs significant thread synchronization overheads,
thus it is allocated a small number of cores, while the GRAPH
process benefits primarily from core-level parallelism. As both
processes in this application are not primarily sensitive to L1
caches, IRONHIDE only shows slight improvements over MI6.
Figure 7:(b) depicts the shared L2 cache miss rates for
each interactive application under the MI6 and IRONHIDE
architectures. The L2 miss rates are improved by up to 2×,
with the exception of <TC, GRAPH> and <LIGHTTPD,
OS> applications. However, unlike L1 cache, the benefits
from IRONHIDE primarily arise due to its dynamic hardware
isolation capability that enables the processor to load-balance
the allocation of L2 cache slices. On the other hand, MI6
configures the last-level cache with a static allocation of
L2 cache slices per secure and insecure processes. Due to
better utilization of the available last-level cache resources,
IRONHIDE delivers improved L2 cache miss rates. For <TC,
GRAPH>, MI6 slightly improves L2 cache miss rate compared
to IRONHIDE. The TC process does not show much L2 cache
locality as it only traverses the input graph once. Thus, it is
allocated only two L2 cache slices (c.f. Figure 6). However, the
input graph being large, does not fit in these two allocated cache
slices, resulting in a higher L2 miss rate. The remaining 62 L2
cache slices are allocated to the GRAPH process, but it brings
insignificant improvements in the miss rate due to its small
working set. Similarly, the LIGHTTPD process does not exhibit
much L2 cache locality due to its random request generation.
Thus, it is provided with only one L2 cache slice (c.f. Figure 6),
whereas the OS process utilizes the remaining cores. Again,
due to the asymmetric L2 cache allocation, IRONHIDE shows
slightly worse L2 miss rate compared to MI6.
D. Cluster Reconfiguration Heuristic
IRONHIDE performance depends on the number of cores
(and the associated compute and cache resources) allocated to
each cluster for load balanced execution. This resource binding
is computed by the proposed security-centric heuristic discussed
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Fig. 8. Impact of the variations in decisions made by the core-reallocation
predictor on the performance of IRONHIDE.
in Section III-B3. The geometric mean completion time across
all interactive applications is reported in Figure 8 for the MI6
baseline, and the Heuristic for IRONHIDE. The Heuristic
delivers a geometric mean ∼2.1× reduction in completion time.
To analyze the efficacy of the heuristic, IRONHIDE is evaluated
for a variety of fixed decision variations, as well as Optimal that
exhaustively computes the best resource binding without any
overheads. The fixed decision variations are measured by taking
a percentage of cores away from the secure cluster, or allocate
cores to the secure cluster. The +x variation represents that
the secure cluster is provided with x% more cores compared
to Optimal. Conversely, the -x variation represents that x%
cores are taken away from the secure cluster and re-allocated
to the insecure cluster. The x is varied between ±5% and ±25%
to evaluate the impact of cluster reconfiguration accuracy on
performance. The Optimal delivers ∼2.3×, while the Heuristic
delivers ∼2.1× improvement in geometric mean completion
time over the MI6 baseline. Figure 8 also shows that Heuristic
performs well within the ±5% decision variations.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Secure Processor Architectures
Academic works, such as Aegis [42] reduce the trusted
computing base (TCB) to a secure processor chip. The TCB
assumes a program running on the processor to be trusted such
that the memory accesses do not leak sensitive information.
Industry developed AMD-SEV [10], Trustzone [43], and TPM
[44] as a fixed-function unit with limited set of capabilities.
To secure arbitrary computation, TPM was extended with TXT
[45] to implement an integrity checking boot process that
attests to the software stack. Intel’s SGX [9] maintains on-
chip enclaves that isolate processes from the untrusted OS.
HotCalls [15] makes an effort to quantify the overheads of SGX,
and report ∼2.5 to 5µs for each ECALL/OCALL. Performance
degradation of ∼40% is reported for a database application
generating 200K requests per second to the untrusted OS.
Moreover, various microarchitecture state leakage channels in
SGX have led to security vulnerabilities [16], [17].
Recent secure processor works [11], [12], [13] extend the
idea of enclaves to alleviate microarchitecture state attacks.
MI6 [11] introduces strong isolation that requires purging the
microarchitecture state of time-shared hardware resources at
each enclave entry/exit. MI6 reports an average purge overhead
of ∼5.4% of the total completion time of an application.
IRONHIDE re-thinks secure processor design in the context of
multicores, where spatially isolated secure and insecure clusters
are formed. The secure process(es) are pinned to the secure
cluster to limit the purge overheads for interactive applications.
B. Protecting Non-Speculative Microarchitecture State
Cache side-channel attacks [1], [4] have been studied
extensively, such as Prime+Probe [1], where the attacker’s
goal is to determine which cache sets have been accessed
by the victim application by observing the latency difference
between a cache hit or a miss. Page translation caches have also
been attacked [46] using similar schemes under Intel’s SGX.
Various works on cache partitioning either isolate caches [12],
[47], or scramble addresses [2], [3] to diminish information
leakage. Research has also shown that routers in the on-chip
networks expose application traffic traces [23] that leads to
information leakage. Furthermore, information can also be
leaked via off-chip memory-based timing channels, where the
adversary monitors memory latencies of the victim applica-
tion [48], [49]. Prior works have explored various mitigation
mechanisms, such as employing time-multiplexed memory
bandwidth reservation [29], or adopting a non-interference
memory controller [50]. The aforementioned works focus on
certain covert channels, while IRONHIDE takes a holistic
approach to protect all microarchitecture state attacks.
C. Protecting Speculative Microarchitecture State
DAWG [12] utilizes protection (or security) domains to
isolate secure data from malicious insecure applications. Both
caches and DRAM are partitioned to ensure secure data
is physically isolated from the insecure data. Therefore,
speculative microarchitecture state attacks [5], [6], [17] do
not materialize due to strong isolation. However, since these
caches are latency sensitive to capacity and conflicts, the
performance penalties stack up with DAWG-like approaches.
InvisiSpec [7] does not assume security domains, and handles
speculative microarchitecture state in both private and shared
caches by temporarily holding unresolved data in side-buffers
invisible at each level of cache hierarchy, and only commit
non-speculative data. It also adds hardware to ensure data
consistency checks before committing loads that resolve as non-
speculative. However, this causes performance losses (reported
>15%) due to diminished benefits from speculative execution.
Unlike the redo-based solution of InvisiSpec, a recent work
CleanupSpec [8] considers the InvisiSpec model and improves
performance by undoing the changes made to the cache sub-
system through speculative instructions. Nevertheless, these
works open a security vulnerability window as a consequence of
moving speculative data across on-chip caches and side-buffers.
In IRONHIDE, the victim and attacker process pairing for
speculative state attacks is only possible in the insecure cluster.
The secure process(es) are strongly isolated from the attacker
since secure data is only allowed to map inside the secure
cluster. Similar to MI6, IRONHIDE envisions a hardware check
for each memory access that ensures the insecure cluster does
not access the secure cluster’s data.
VII. CONCLUSION
To enable a secure processor, Intel SGX introduces the
concept of enclaves that temporally execute alongside ordinary
processes. However, it is vulnerable across various speculative
and non-speculative microarchitecture state attacks. State-
of-the-art MI6 secure processor adopts the idea of strong
isolation to mitigate such vulnerabilities. However, it suffers
from performance degradation due to microarchitecture state
purging of the private resources on every secure enclave entry
and exit. IRONHIDE extends strong isolation capabilities
in the context of multicores, and forms spatially isolated
secure and insecure clusters of cores. For an interactive
application, IRONHIDE pins the secure process(es) to the
secure cluster, where they interact with the insecure cluster
process(es) without purging the microarchitecture state on each
enclave entry/exit. IRONHIDE implements dynamic hardware
isolation that dynamically re-allocates core-level resources
across clusters for load balanced execution. For a set of user and
OS interactive applications, IRONHIDE improves geometric
mean performance over the multicore MI6 baseline by 2.1×.
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